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1. THE FORMATION OF THE TRADE 
CORPORATION 
The Trade Corporation which was created by virtue of 
_ a law adopted by the 1942-3 session of the Imperial Dil:!t. is -
an epochmaking mechanism for carrying on the Greater East -
Asia War and may be considered as an important and 
appropriate trade policy. 
As we have already discussed on many occasion,') there 
are definite principles and theories in connection with the 
trade of Greater East Asia wider· territory economy. In 
principle, it maybe said that East Asia trade has more ·to 
do with the principle of absolute production cost rather thar 
that of comparative production cost, and in consequence, it 
depends more on the principle of domestic commerce rather 
than on that of foreign trade. Even after the conclusion of 
the Greater East Asia War and the establishment of Greater· 
East Asia· economy, there will be assuredly no trade of the 
Anglo·Saxonpattern, not even controlled trade of the more 
recent origin, 56 long as it is trade controlled individualIy 
by different riations. Furthermore, even more progres!!i,ve 
trade plans could not be executed in their original forms so 
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long as they are individual plans of different· nations. No 
one today will doubt the absolute necessity of having trade 
for. the whole East Asia sphere which shall be synthetically 
planned and synthetically controlled. Nor' can anyone anti-
cipate the revival in any near future of a purely profit·making 
trade such as the one carried on by the· Anglo-Saxon nations. 
This is one 1:eason why the Japanese equivalent for the Trade 
Corporation is "Koeki Eidan" instead of .. Boeki Eidan ". 
Now, let us see what concrete trade mechanism would 
be needed for the perfect ·execution of such synthetically 
planned and controlled trade and whether or,not the existing 
trade mechanism is sufficient for such trade purposes .. · It 
goes without saying that tr~de agreements and clearing 
agreements as national policies or institutions such as I have 
, been advocating these years should be established among the 
nations of Greater East Asia. However, there remains the 
unsolved question of adopting concrete mechanism for car-
rying on trade under the systems of· trade agreements and 
of clearing agreements. 
As is generally known. the exchange of goods has been 
. taking. place under ~ special trade mechanism between Japan 
and the occupied resions in the south where military ad-
ministration· is carried on. Although such a special trade 
system is· inevitable under the existing conditions, it should 
be modified as soon as the present conditions are altered, so 
that this system- should not be considered as permanent. 
At any· rate, the more important problem in these regions 
is that of the futUre instead of the present. 
The problem of trade we are confronting· to-day when 
all trade of Europe or of the third-countries is suspended, 
. concerns itself with the trade of such countries as Manchou-
kuo i Kwantung Territory. China, French Indo-China, and 
Thailand in none of which military administration is carried 
on. Our 'trade with. these "regions is s~iI1 in the stage. of 
iddividual trade control by different nations. In Japan our 
trade with these regions is carried on by ~ur old-time· trade 
associations under the supervis.ion . of the Trade Control 
. -
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power. 
As is generally known, our trade· with the foregoing 
countries has been marked by a great difference in prices 
which, if left in natural conditions, would inevitably cause 
great iricreases in Japan's exports due to excess profits there-
from and great decreases in her imports due to great losses 
" therefrom. This c.ondition w.ould· be unavoidable als.o in the 
future in facing the actual trade problems 9f Greater East 
Asia economy. This is because our synthetic policy of prices 
for all parts of Greater EaSt Asia for the purpose of mini-
mizing price differences which we would have to carry out 
would-not be always successful in actuality. We have under 
the existing trade:mechanism the so-caned reserve fund 
system for adjusting price levels. It is intended to com-
pensate losses due to imports by accumulating a part of 
profits -from exports, but it has failed to function as desired, 
. chiefly because while price levels were variable the reserve 
fund was constant. It may seem . that this defect will be 
eliminated by the ad.option of a sliding reserve ftlnd ·system . 
However, its successful operation in actuality is accompanied 
by serious difficulties. 
Viewed both from the general theory of wartime trade 
and our actual wartime needs, the greatest object .of our 
"trade at present is importation .. If· anyone should regard 
the problems of export as the principal· problems of trade 
. and advocate export enlivenment ·or pr.omotion, ·he is highly 
mistaken, as he is a prisoner of the wrong idea of peace-
time trade of the past. Whereas peace-time trade has export 
as. its object ·and adopts whatever is necessary for export, 
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wartime trade aims at import as its greatest objective and 
carries on export only as a necessary means of import. For 
this reason, supposing a nation could carryon its import 
without resorting to any export whatever, that country would 
be in an ideal wartime trade condition. 
But the actual trade cond ition of, Greater East Asia, 
especially that of the countries outside the occupied territori-
es, is such that if it is left in its natural conditions, there' 
would be no -import and only export would take, place,' 
because.ofthe differences of price levels as has been already 
'noted. If the old-time commercial trade is allowed to be 
carried on in such conditions of _price levels, export trade of 
exorbitant profit.mak'ing would be' carried on and the detri-
mental import trade would be entirely stopped. Therein 
lies the chief reason .lor the establishment of the Trade 
Corporation. _ In order to reach this conclusion, it would be 
necessary to consider the adjustment of price levels. 
_ t _, .. 
2. THE ADJUSTMENT OF PRICE 'LEVELS 
'. -In . thellberaI economic ruechanism, differe~ces of price-
levels among nations tended to be adjusted by the fluctua-
tions of exchange quotations which were manifested by 
means of trade. Such atendency may be seen ill' our present 
price conditjons in the rise of the value of the yen due to 
export increases ,and import decreases and" also in the de-
preciation of the value of the, Continental currencies, and 
this exchange fluctuation will tend to restrict our export 'and 
encourage our import. We canndt deny this tendency if we 
ar!! to accept liberal economy as our premises. ,But we should 
not jump from this to the acceptance, of the parity theory 
of purchasing power and to the denial of the fixed theory' 
of exchange rates.') I have elsewhere criticized the parity 
theory' of purchasing 'power and assert~d-the fixed theory of 
exchange, so that ,I shall ~here dwell on if as" briefly' as pos-
sible. The theory of adjustment of price levels through 
exchange quotations presupposes the international accounts 
.. 
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·of trade. only and excludes those of non-trade· factors, es-
peciaHy..the accounts of the movement of capital. In actuality, 
however, the capital of the country is exported to both the 
Asiatic Continent and the southern region in large amounts .. 
For this reasOn, even supposing that we continue export 
excess, if we invest our export receipts in these countries or 
Carryon a positive export of our capital, exchange quota' 
tions would not fluctuate as suppossed by the theory. On 
the contrary the fluctuation may take place exactly in the 
opposite direction. Although according to this theory, the 
permanent continuation of export excess or import excess is 
unthinkable, in actuality such a phenomenon is seen as in 
the case of the· continued export excess in the trade of the 
. southern region. This is .because there were capitalexp!'rts 
on the other hand. For this. reason, it would be a great 
mistake both as theory and economic policY to obstruct the 
formation of the fixed policy of exchange by asserting such 
theQry of the A'nglo-Saxon origin as the parity theory of 
'. . 
pUrchasing power and the adjustment of exchange. 
Secondly, let us examine whether or not there are other 
means of adjusting the price levels in East Asia .. I shaH here 
. take up the East Asia link system which 1 have been advo-
cating for· many years. The link system during the stage 
of the China Incident was based on the· import perinit system . 
and enforced in our trade with the third nations outside of 
the yen bloc territory. But the new link system now advo-
cated totally differs as regards these two points. Territorially, 
the link . system will be restricted to the East Asia sphere 
and will be predicated on the export permit system instead 
of the import permit system.· Traders wishing to make a 
profitable export to some part of East Asia should first make 
an unprofitable import from the same territory, the latter 
being thus linked to the former. Or, the traders may be 
required to fulfill some· obligation as a 'condition for securing 
an export permit. If such measures are adopted, the losses . 
in~urrE~d by import may be compensated by the profit accru-
ing from export in the calculation of the traders themselves; 
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and the difference of price levels may be· adjusted and the 
continuation of' import may be assured. 
We attach great value to the function of the East Asia 
link system in adjusting prices. For this reason, this system 
would be sufficient if' its object is only to adjust prices. 
But, as I stated at outset, the mechanism of East Asia' should 
, aim at carrying on the synthetic and controlled trade of the 
whole East Asia sphere and for this reason, the East Asia 
link system based on the . commercialism of traders would be 
highly undesirable, because such a system would be incapable 
of 'carrying out such an objective. , 
Thirdly, the pool system based on commodity classifica-
tion maybe capable of . adjusting prices. For . instance, the 
import of cheap copper may be pooled with the high priced' 
. domestic copper, or the profit made in the importation of 
foreign rice may be used in compensating the difference of 
prices between domestic· rice and foreign rice. But for the 
function of this system, there are some 'prerequisites: first, 
there should be both imported and domestic commodity. of 
the-same kind; and secondly, there-should be conditions in 
which the profit made in importing a cheaper commodity 
can be utilized in compensating .Iosses due to the higher 
price of the domestic commodity. But the general conditions 
in actuality, on the other hand, are just the opposite: the 
most important question we are confronting is how to com-
pensate the losses incurred in. the high. priced imports. If 
we should. attempt fo compensate such losses by the domestic. 
prices of the same commodity we shall come into. conflict 
with the wartime low-price policy of the nation. Thus, this 
system is restricted to only a small number of special com-
modities and for this reason it cannot be. a general method 
of !1djusting prices. for the trade of East Asia. 
Fourthly, as to the reserve fund' system already noted, 
it may be an effective method at least· in 'theory. but in 
actuality it is subject to some defects. Not only it cannot 
fully function as a means of apjusting prices because of the 
conflict between the variability of price levels and the con: 
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stancy of the reserve fund; but it may stand in the way of 
. executing the wartime trade inasmuch as . it is primarily 
based on the commercialism of· traders. For. instance, when 
they-can secure some profit even after deducting the reserve 
fund from the profit made in export, they wilrbe exclusively 
engaged in export, and would not engage in import which is' 
most necessary in wartime conditions. For in import their 
losses will be compensated only by the reserve fund and 
there will be no actual profit·earning. Thus, while in theory 
.the reserve fund is to be adjusted automatically· without any 
excess or deficit, in actuality the furid· has been accumulated 
as an outcome of the system. This accumulation of the 
reserve fund itself is an . evidence of the failure of this 
system. " 
The various methods of adjusting price levels among the 
different nations of East· Asia such as we have already seen, 
namely, the exchange compensation system, the link com-
pensation system,. the· pool compensation system and the 
reserve fund system,-. these are all inadequate infulfiIIing 
their function· of compensation; But even supposing they 
areeapable of compensation, that will be all and each of 
them· is highly insufficient in respect to the function of 
highest importanee in . East Asia. trade, that is, the .execution 
of trade plans. 
Needless to state, the real issue here is not so much the 
-adjustmE)nt of price levels. True, idealistically speaking, the 
price levels of all countries of East Asia should be the same . 
and identical and the price policies of all countries should 
aim at such an ideal condition. In actuality, however, the 
attainment of such an· ideal condition is C?f utmost difficulty 
if not of impossibility. To make the prices.of individual 
commodities for all countries identical wilInever be possible. 
The central trade problem would be to adopt the most suita-
ble waydf executing the synthetic trade plan in spite of the . 
differences in price levels in different countries, and the 
foregoing various methods of adjusting price levels are noth-
ing.but the means of this supreme objective. Our aim after 
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all is to carry out the trade plans outlined, and various 
systems of adjusting price levels are to be adopted as the 
means of attaining this objective. For this reason, even sup-
posing these systems have succeeded in adjusting prices, 
they would)e incapable of carrying on their real function, 
if they should fail to impede the execution of trade plans 
for one reason or otheL This is the theoretical ground for 
the formation of the Trade Corporation. 
3. THE EXECUTION OF TRADE PLANS 
Needless to state, the establishment of Greater East Asia 
. economy' consists in the execution of the so-called planned 
economy or, to. be more specific, the execution of planned 
controlled economy. Now, one of the important conditions 
for the smooth execution of plann~d and controlled economy 
is that a nation's external economic relations, trade in par-
ticular, should be carried on as have been planned out. 
This is shown most eloquently by how Manchoukuo's five,' 
year plan and Japan's materials mobilization plan were 
forced to be revised by the outbreak of the European War 
and the refrigeration of Japanese capital by the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, respectively. There is no exaggeration in the 
statement that the success or failure of economic plans 
depends on the success or failure of trade plans. The vari-
ous problems of domestic economy excepting some natural 
or technical impediments may be solved by the one·sided 
will of a nation, but our external economic relations cannot 
be adjusted as in the case of our domestic economy, even 
within the Greater East Asia economic sphere, which is 
under our guidance. 
For this reason, the central problem of Greater East 
Asia trade is how to execute smoothly the trade plans based 
on the synthetic plans of production and consumption for 
. , 
the entire East Asia sphere. Moreover, inasmuch as the 
price levels'in the various parts of the sphere are unequal 
. in actuality and the low prices of Japati' make a sharp con-
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trast with the high prices. of .other countries, if the former 
commercial trade· is allowed to be carried~ on, our export 
increases. and import decreases. would become .inevitable. 
But viewed· both from the conditions of materials in our 
wartime economy and the export of vast quantities of goods 
required for the execution of war, our wartime trade should 
aim at the promotion of import and the suppression of 
export. And this demand contradicts the natural tendency 
. above noted. 
The elimination of this contradiction would be impossible 
of accomplishment- by means of the former system cif trade 
control because although trade control is capable of supres· 
sing the profitable export or import, it cannot promote the 
unprofitable import or export. 
Under such circumstances, in order to materialize the 
importation or exportation of definite quantities as shown 
in. trade plans, there should be. a trade mechanism capable 
of carrying' on the pre-determined import or export, and no 
regard should be paid to profit or loss of trade. It has be-
come clear that such a work can never be carried on by 
the··former trade of commercial enterprise. The execution 
. of trade' without regard to profit·making or· loss involved 
must be after aU undertaken by the State. However, since 
State finance· does not allow the national treasury to earn 
profit from trade or to pay for loss in trade, an independent 
management would be required for all this. Thus, the idea 
of the Trade Corporation was born. 
- The object of the Trade Corporation is to carryon 
trade plans. The Trade Corporation has the mission of 
carrying on correctly the materials mobilization plan for the 
entire of Greater Asia or the importation or exportation of 
definite quantities of. goods by Japan based on both produc· 
tion and consumption plans for the entire sphere. For this 
reason, the success or failure of the Trade Corporation 
~ 
would be determined by its successor failure in its trade 
transaction of the pre·determined quantities, and its financial 
accounts, that is its profit or loss would be of secondarly 
THE FORMATION OF THE TRADE CORPORATION 35 
importance. However, the Trade Corporation should live 
up to the principle of making the greatest .possible success 
by the least possible sacrifice in the present case also, and 
so long as it carries on trade plans with certainty, it should 
also maintain the best possible financial status. But whereas 
in the former enterprise, profit·making was regarded as its 
object and trade was regarded as means, the Trade Cor· 
poration regards trade as its object and profit and loss' are 
considered as incidental. This is the essential difference 
between the two. 
In the condition of trade equilibrium, the Trade Cor· 
poration may continue its existence in an ideal condition in 
which there will 1;>e neither profit nor loss. This is because 
when this trade equilibrium is established on equal price as 
in the case of liberal economy, the movement of goods will 
take place at their necessary expenses and for this reason 
the Trade Corponition would not secure either above or 
below the amount of-expenses involved. Again, when trade 
equilibrium is established on the unequal prices due to con-
trolled economy, the Trade Corporation will receive on 
profit nor incur no loss therefrom. This is because when 
prices in our country are high, the profit of import will be 
cancelled against the loss of export, and when prices in our 
country are low as in the present case, the· loss of import 
can be cancelled against the profit of export. At any rate, 
in the case of trade equilibrium the Trade Corporation can 
bear its own expenses· without any profit or loss what-
soever. 
On the other hand, the Trade Corporation either yields 
profit or incurs loss in the case of unbalanced trade. For 
instance, in the low price cond ition of our country like the 
present case, if we have import excess, the ·TradeCorpora-
tion will continue to incur loss.. On the other hand, if our 
country shows an export excess, the Trade Corporation will 
accumulate. profits. When the price condition of our country 
is high, there will be profit in the case of import excess 
and there will be loss in the case of export excess. . 
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Thus, theoretically speaking, the Trade Corporation 
may make profit 'or incur loss as the outcome' of its carrying 
on trade activities. However, in the existing actuality, our 
prices are low as compared with those in other countries 
of East ,Asia and our trade has a tendency to show an 
. -import excess. In the face of these two factors, the Trade 
Corporation is liable to incur loss rather than make profit. 
This is a· welcome outcome in the execution of our present 
wartime condition~ For this reason, the loss incurred by 
the Trade Corporation shollid be given a State compensa-
tion. 
4. THE TRADE CORPORATION AND TRADERS. 
When the Trade Corporation has been fulIy established, 
what will be the lot of tbose traders who have been engaged . 
in the nation's foreign trade? Will there be absolutely no 
room for Jheir business activities, or will they be able to 
survive in some· way? These 'questions must be considered 
from the standpoint of getting the best result. from trade 
plans .. If these questions are considered from the viewpoint 
of furthering the interests of these traders. or of relieving 
their hard lot, then the conclusion, of course, will be quite 
different from the one which wiIl be reached when the same 
questions are considered from the standpoint of the State. 
If these traders are unnecessary fro'm the standpoint of the 
State, then their relief should be considered separately. At 
any rate, the State trade should never be sacrificed on their 
account. 
By far the most important problem in connection with 
government companies such as' the Trade Corporations is 
to create a mechanism which is capable of displaying the 
highest possible efficiency in its activities. It is'incontes-
table that in the stage of State total war as at present, both 
man. power and material goods should show the, highest 
possible efficiency. However, it is generally admitted that 
the greatest shortcoming of State enterprises such as the' 
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. Trade Corporation' is their low efficiency and all criticisms 
against the existing government companies have been con· 
centrated on' this point. Thus, there is a good reason to 
stress the probiem of effiicient management in making a 
study of the internal mechanism of the Tade Corporation. 
I ain convinced that the Trade Corporation should not 
carryon its trade activities monopolistically. On the con· 
trary, it should endeavour to utilize to the fullest extent the 
long experience, knowledge and initiative on the part of the 
traders so that it may be enabled to carry out State trade 
acitivities most efficiently. 
In what form and relations, then,should the traders be 
included in the Trade Corporation rNOw, it should be noted 
that the Trade Corporation is the dispenser of all trade 
activities and is the source of all calculations. Profits and 
losses attendant on trade entirely belong to this organiia· 
. tion. Hence, the traders are no longer traders who carry 
on business on their .. own accounts. In this sense it may 
. be said to leave! no room for the traders: 
However, it is not only possible but also,necessary from 
the standpoint of. the efficient management of the Trade 
Corporation that the traders should engage in "trade activi· 
ties as contrac·tors and for a definite amount of commission, 
under the direction of the corporation. It is not that all 
traders are to become contractors alike. 'On the contrary, 
there should be a division of labour between the direct 
activities of the Trade Corporation and those entrusted to 
the traders. 
The business to be undertaken directly by the Trade 
Corporation is the proper trade between Japan and the 
Asiatic Continent and the southern region. For this reason, 
the Trade Corporation should have its offices or agencies 
at all ports. The business of the Trade Corporation should 
be restricted to the movement of goods between these ports 
and our Japanese ports. Other businesses except those of 
special goods should be entrusted to the traders. Thus, the 
traders should carryon the business of collecting our import 
, 
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goods jn other countries-and of distributing the exported 
goods. They should also be. in charge of distributing of 
imported goods and of collecting export gooas in Japan . 
. Thus, the traders would not be traders in the real sense 
of -the term; they are merely the domestic distributors both 
here and abroad and. would be engaged in the collection 
and distribution of goods under the engaged in the collec· 
tion and distribution of goods under the trust of the Trade 
Corporation. -
However, the traders who are the contractors of the 
Trade Corporation cannot be the same as the traders of 
the past. As is generaIly known, they have come to assume 
an efficient industrial form of some definite scale as a result 
of their business amalgamation and adjustment of manage-
ment and ownership. For this reason they are truly the' 
selected and able body of traders. But there is an important 
problem as to what should be the mechanism by which 
they may be permitted to participate in the business func-
tion of the Trade Corporation . 
. Here, the principle of past business record on the part 
of the traders as the basis of their participation should be 
avoided as far as possible. Such a principle, if unavoidable, 
should be restricted to a minimum. To decide on their 
participation on the basis of this principle of past business 
record would result in the elimination of their initiatives 
and individual endeavours and thus would have the effect 
of impeding an efficient management. At the same time, 
the abuse of monopolistic distribution should be prevented 
at all cost. Should the Trade Corporation allow some 
traders to become monopolistic contractors in entrusting to 
them its trade functions, it would be highly difficult to 
carryon trade plans efficiently. On the contrary, the Trade 
Corporation should appoint many traders as its contractors 
in order to make them compete in !=arrying out their trusted 
. trade business, if an efficient management of trade activities 
is to be maintained. 
Generally speaking, the idea that control and competi-
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tion are incompatible to each other is erroneous. True, the 
traditional competition in the quality and price of commodi-
ties would not be permitted under the system of economic. 
control. It is a shortsighted idea that :competition cannot 
take place outside of quality and price. Eorcompetition in 
a new sense can take place when a commodity of the same 
quality and of the same price is distributed. Such competi-
tion is not only possible but also desirable under the system 
of controlled economy. I shaH call this competition "voca-
donal competition", in my wish to distinguish it from the 
liberal competition of the past and make it a new and im-
. portant factor that should be introduced .. into the present 
system of economv, thereby making its ·efficienct manage-
ment possible. We should also devise some mechanism by 
which. this vocational -competition may. take place among 
the traders who are to be under the sway of the Trade 
Corporation. Of course, it will be noted that there would 
be no room for competition in the past sense in their 
endeavours,since they are to remain .only as commission 
merchants and both their commission selling and commis-
sion buying will be made on a limited consignment. In 
other words, they buy some definite goods at specified 
prices and sell them at specified prices. . For this reason, 
there will remain no free competition in the traditional 
sense among them. However, there will be' some left for 
the displaying of their initiative and endeavour· so that a 
mechanism should· by contrived by which the amount of 
goods handled by the traders can be either increased or 
decreased at· will. If, on. ·the contrary, there should be a 
system of allotted or monopolistic distribution, there will 
be· no initiative or endeavour displayed by, the. traders and 
it will be almost impossible to execute the trade plans 
without failure. Suppose we have to import five million 
piculs of Chinese· raw cotton. Instead· of . entrusting. the 
work .of buying to a single trading company on a monopo-
listic basis, several companies may be compete ·in getting the 
largest possible amount of 'cotton purchases. The latter 
/ 
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system w.i11 undoubtedly prove a more efficient method and 
will probably succeed in buying - the amount greater than 
that of the original plan, and thus will be . more certain of 
succeSs in the mobilization of goods, than the monopolistic 
scheme. Needless to state, all plans should aim at a level 
much. higher than that which it intends to reach, in order 
to assure their ultimate success. In order to carry out 
trade plans with certainty and with the highest efficiency; 
,a new scheme'-.erribodying ;vocational competition' will be 
needed. 
5. THE TRADE CONTROL ASSOCIATION AND THE 
IMPORTANT GOQDS ADMINISTRATION' 
CORPORATION.' 
When the proposed Trade Corporation actually comes 
into' existence, both the Trade Control Association and the 
Important Goods Adlllinistration Corporationc ' are destined 
to undergo an evolutionary dissolution as they would have 
lost their significance of existence. However, their theore-
tical survey reveals that there is still' room for various 
problems worthy of consideration. 
Let us first take up the problems of the Trade Control 
Association. -If the proposed Trade Corporation were to 
carry out by itself trade activities in detail, then of course, 
the traders would have to pass out and consequently there 
would be no need' of any trade body such as the Trade 
Control Association. I have already tried to show that. the 
traders should continue their business existence this time 
- . 
as appointed agents for the Trade Corporation, and this 
view of mine is shared by many persons. If, therefore, the 
traders should continue to carryon the trade activities on 
behalf of the Trade Corporation, showing, as they should 
truly do, their highest efficiency by the new vocational 
competition, then there would still be the need of their own 
trade organizations and of the synthetic and unified body 
such as the Trade Control Association. The Trade Control· 
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Association primarily is a body which. does not engage in 
economic. activities, and thus it will retain the reason of its 
existence even after the establishment of the Trade Cor· 
poration, whose business IS to engage in economic activities, 
so 10hg as individual traders continue to . exist. In' such a 
situation, the Trade Control Association will have several 
functions. First, it w ill have to act as the organ of super· 
vision and control over the traders who have been readjusted 
'as trade agents .. Secondly: it should be the connecting link 
between the traders and the Trade Corporation. Because 
it will be noted. that, in making the traders to. act as 
agents, the Trade. Corporation would have to make them 
organize themselves both territorially and according to 
different com.E10dities .. Thirdly, the Trade Control Associa· 
tion has the'important mission of being a connecting link 
between the Government, on one hand, and the traders or 
the Trade Corporation., on the other. For, although, the 
Government can giveordE!rs direct to the Trade Corporation 
regarding the execution of trade plans, all matters relating 
to trade control concern. themselves with the traders, thus 
necessitating the .existence of a control organization. So 
long as .the traders continue their business even. though in 
their new capacity as brokers or consigflrhent merchants, 
the Trade Control Association as their organ of control will 
never lose its reason of existence. 
Let' us next tak~ up the Important Goods Administra· 
tion Corporation the object of which i~ to administer or 
preserve important goods. Since the important goods dealt 
with by this corporation are_ not limited to the objects of 
trade but actually include· domestic goods as well, its func, 
tionis no duplication with that of the Trade Corporation; 
nor does it come into a conflict with it. 1 he Trade Cor· 
poration aims at handling goods· in a continued stream and 
its ideal is not to keep stocks, The' Important Goods 
Administration Corporation, on the other . hand, has the 
object of keeping goods in store for long periods of time. 
The relation.s· of the two corporations resemble those be-
, 
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tween the commercial bank which handles circulating capital 
and the real estate bank which handles fixed capital. Both 
banks are necessary for carrying on their respective acti-
vities,and not only they can ,starid, together without a con-, 
tradiction, but they can also mutually aid each' other in 
fulfilling their functions_ The Trade Corporation must 
import goods in amounts greater than those given out' in 
the plan of national i:nobilization of goods and' keep them 
in store in' order to assure the actualization of the plan, 
The corporation must also'. purchase . domestic' goods in 
exessive amounts and keep them in store for future export 
purposes_ But to own goods in store will be against the 
floating nature of the Trade Corporation, and for this re!,!son 
it will be necessary 'to make the Important Goods 'Ad'. 
ministration Corporation own and store them. On the other , 
hand,the ,Important Goods Administration Corporation must 
import various 'goods from the south through the Trade 
. Corporation and in disposing of domestic goods it must also 
export' them through the same . trade organization. The 
Important Goods' Administration Corporation is' entitIedto 
dispose of tbe' goods in private possession without owning 
them, but no such right is enjoyed by the Trade Corpora-
tion, which,on t~e contrarY,must purchase. and own goods 
before disposing of them. 
This is another difference in the functions of the two 
corporations. . 
To summarize; even after the establishment of the Trade 
Corporation, there will be an ample room for the function-
ing of the Important Goods Administration Corporation. 
The two organization do not duplicate in their functions, 
nor do they contradict each other. On the contrary, they 
can display their efficiency, through their mutual coopera-
tion. In short, there is absolutely no reason for the evolu-
tionary dissolution of the Important Goods Administration 
Corporation from the theoretical viewpoint. 
., ,: 
, 
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6. VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF THE TRADE 
CORPORATION. 
LastlY,I shaH take up several remaining problems -of 
the Trade Corporation. 
The first problem concerns itself with the sphere of the, 
activities of the Trade Corporation. Idealistically, of course, . 
the entire East Asia should be Its sphere and in, the future 
the countries of both the north and the south should be 
included in it. However,as a real problem, it will be 
necessary to conceive it in two stages. In the first stage, 
the sphere should include the conntries of the north 'and· 
French" Indo·China and Thailand.· After preliminary pro-
blems have been solved ,. and some experience has been 
made, the entire southern countries should be included in' 
the second stage .. As is generally known; these -two spheres 
have' been under different trade mechanil3ms and for this 
reason there will be some dislocation if they are included 
in the same economic sphere ,at once. Moreover, an 
elaborate mechanism created overnight is liable to fail, 
although it may prove successful if given. proper time 
interval. Again, the demand for the Trade Corporation 
comes from the existing situation in the north. The new 
trade mechanism of the south has not yet attained the same 
stage. True, southern trade should. be included in the· 
futureact}vities of the Trade Corporation, for demand for 
the execution of the' synthetic and planned trade for Greater ' 
East Asia is self-evident. . . , 
Secondly, the Trade Corporation is a Japanese institu-
tion which carries on trade between Japan and . other 
countries including other territories of East Asia. Thus, it 
would not be the function of this corporation to carryon 
trade between other countries ,of East ASia, for' instance, 
between Manchoukuo and ·China. In actuality, however, 
there will be triple or quadruple relations among East-
Asiatic countries, when we are carrying on our trade plans. 
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China, we' shall have to el{port Manchoukuo's cereals to 
that country. Needless, to state, we should attempt to make 
the smooth execution of our' trade plans in anticipation of 
such difficulties, But on the other hand, it would be im-
possible for a trade organization of Japan to monopolize the 
mutual trade of all independent nations of East Asia except 
those territories under our direct administration. Idealistically 
speaking, each nation of East Asia, such as Manchoukuo, 
China and Thailand, should have its own trad~ corporation 
of an independent basis and should share in the 'execution 
of the synthetic trade plans of the entire East Asia in their 
mutuai cooperation. Needless to state, the trade between 
the territories i.tnder the direct administration of Japan 
should be carried out by the branches of the Trade Cor· 
poration in these territories. 
, Thirdly, let us see whether or not the Trade Corpora-
tion should "also carry out the trade with the third countries 
or the countries outside East Asia, when such trade has 
been reopened., We do not share in the opinion of 'those, 
who believe that such trade, with the third countries will 
be liberal trade. Nor do we believe that there' will be 
absolutely. no trade with the third countries in the future. 
There will be such trade with the third countries though 
of much less importance than hitherto, but it, will not be 
liberal trade such as we saw in the past.' There is no 
doubt that it will be carri~d out as a newly planned trade 
or controlled trade. But the- meaning of both plans and 
control will be different for the third couritries and the 
nations of East Asia; This is an inevitable outcome, of 
the difference between the countries ,over which, our right 
of leadership is established and those nations over, which 
this right does not extend. Since the trade with the third 
countries will be also a planned and controlled' trade, we 
conclude that there Should be an organization similar to the 
-Trade Corporation and it should be charged with the task 
of carrying out such trade. But because of the peculiarities 
of third-countries trade, such an organization should be 
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independent of the Trade Corporation. In other words, 
there should be two distinct trade bodies, namely, the 
; 
Greater East Asia Trade Corporation and the Third· 
Countries Trade Corporation, and we should let them 
cooperate with each other in executing the Government's 
trade plans .. 
1) My work, the Theory of Greater East Asia Economy, Chapter 3, 
Part II. 
2) Idem, Chapter 4, Part IL 
.' 
